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Credit Supply versus Demand: 





Banking crises involve periods of persistently low credit and economic growth. 
Banks’ balance sheets are then weak but so are those of non-financial corporate 
borrowers. Hence, a crucial question is whether credit growth is low due to supply or 
to demand factors. However convincing identification has been elusive due to a lack 
of detailed loan application-, bank-, and firm-level data. Access to a dataset of loan 
applications in Spain that is matched with complete bank and firm balance-sheet data 
covering the period from 2002 to 2010 allows us to identify bank and firm balance-
sheet channels. We find robust evidence showing that bank balance-sheet strength 
determines the success of loan applications and the granting of loans in crisis times. 
The heterogeneity in firm balance-sheet strength determines loan granting in both 
good and crisis times, although the potency of this firm balance-sheet channel is the 
largest in the latter period. Our findings therefore hold important implications for both 
theory and policy. 
 
Keywords: bank lending channel, credit supply, business cycle, credit crunch, capital, 
liquidity. 






1.  Introduction 
Since 2007 Western Europe and the United States have experienced a severe 
banking crisis, followed by weak credit growth and a strong economic recession. 
These recent events are not unique. Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, which 
trigger deep and long-lasting recessions, with depressed credit growth (Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009); Schularick and Taylor (2011)). 
The main channel by which banks’ balance-sheet weaknesses affect the economy 
at large is through a reduction of credit supply (Bernanke (1983)). But balance sheets 
of non-financial corporate borrowers may also be weak and credit demand may be 
low owing to bad economic prospects (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)). 
Moreover, banking crises are not exogenous phenomena, but often follow a period of 
strong credit growth (Kindleberger (1978); Schularick and Taylor (2011)). 
A crucial question, therefore, is whether credit growth depends on supply or on 
demand factors, both in good and in crisis times. Credit supply is affected by the 
banks’ balance-sheet strength, the so-called bank lending channel (see e.g. Bernanke 
and Gertler (1987); Bernanke and Gertler (1995); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); 
Bernanke (2007); Adrian and Shin (2010); Adrian and Shin (2011); Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2011)). Demand is affected by the firm balance-sheet strength, the so-
called firm balance-sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995); Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996); Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999)). Bank and firm net worth vary over the business cycle, but bank net 
worth and balance-sheet strength may especially matter in financial crisis times 
(Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011)). 2	
	
However, fully-convincing identification of the bank and firm balance-sheet 
channels has remained elusive due to unavailability of detailed micro data (Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995)). Spain, however, offers an ideal setting for identification: (i) As 
far as we are aware, Spain is the only country where loan applications are available 
for all banks and, moreover, include also an identifier for the borrower lodging the 
application. Hence both bank and borrower identity are known, which is crucial to 
identify credit availability; (ii) The credit application data can be matched with 
comprehensive bank balance-sheet data (collected by the supervisor) and complete 
firm balance-sheet data, which can proxy for the strength of bank and firm balance-
sheets. This information is essential to distinguish between the bank and the firm 
balance-sheet channels. 
We analyze the bank and firm balance-sheet channels using loan applications 
from Spain which are matched with complete bank and firm balance-sheet data (for 
example identity, size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, credit history and defaults). The 
data which is available at a monthly frequency covers the period from 2002 to 2010, 
which allows us to analyze the period before the start of the financial crisis in 
August 2007 which was characterized by good economic conditions (henceforth 
“good times”), and the banking crisis period which started in August 2007 and we 
study this period until June 2010 (henceforth “crisis times”). 
Analyzing first only bank balance sheet strength and loan application granting, 
we find robust evidence that heterogeneity in bank balance-sheet strength does not 
determine loan granting in good times. However, it does determine loan granting in 
crisis times, in particular bank size, capital, liquidity, and the doubtful loan ratio. In 
consequence, the estimates suggest that credit supply factors only matter in crisis 
times.  3	
	
In contrast, when analyzing the effect of firm balance-sheet strength on loan 
granting, we find evidence that firm heterogeneity in balance-sheet strength 
determines the probability a loan is granted to the applying firm both in good and in 
crisis times. Firm balance-sheet strength, nevertheless, matters even more in crisis 
times than in good times, with for example the impact of firm leverage on loan 
application granting more than doubling in crisis times as compared to in good 
times. 
The key contribution of our paper is the identification strategy we employ and the 
estimates we obtain. The identification of the bank versus the firm balance-sheet 
channel is important both for testing theoretical models and for policy (see the last 
part of the paper). There is a large empirical literature on the balance-sheet channels 
that started with a macro approach and that, to achieve better identification, moved 
to micro level data (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)): At the bank level to identify the 
bank balance-sheet (or lending) channel (Kashyap and Stein (2000)) and at the firm 
level to identify the firm balance-sheet channel (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1996)).
1 The papers in the literature so far ‒ and due to data unavailability ‒ do not 
use loan applications to analyze credit granting. In addition, as banks with different 
size, net worth and risk tend to lend to firms with different size, net worth and risk 
an analysis either at the bank level or at the firm level may be biased. Therefore, the 
identification of the bank and firm balance-sheet channels can only be done with 
loan applications matched with bank and firm identity and complete balance-sheet 
																																																								
1   A large empirical literature has investigated the bank- and firm-balance sheet channels 
independently, with the analysis done at either the bank or the firm level. On the bank side see 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Jayaratne and 
Morgan (2000), Ashcraft (2006), Gan (2007), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Black, Hancock and Passmore 
(2009), and Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2009), among others. On the firm side, see Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), for example. 4	
	
data for both. As far as we are aware, this paper is the first in the literature to do so, 
hereby relying on data from Spain. 
This data moreover allows us, as we explain in detail in Section 2, to use 
firm*time fixed effects (which control comprehensively for the firm channel) to 
identify the bank balance-sheet channel;
2 and to use bank*time fixed effects (which 
controls comprehensively for the bank channel) to identify the firm balance-sheet 
channel. Importantly, our analysis suggests that not controlling adequately for either 
the firm or bank channel results in biased results that are not robust to including 
either firm*time or bank*time fixed effects – i.e., not controlling for the firm or bank 
balance-sheet channel biases the estimates on the potency of the bank or firm 
balance-sheet channel. 
Another intended contribution of our paper to the literature ‒ one we deem to be 
very important ‒ is that we analyze loan application granting both during the last 
credit boom and also during the 2007-2010 crisis itself. We therefore contribute to 
historical studies by Kindleberger (1978), Bernanke (1983), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), and Schularick and Taylor (2011) by analyzing the recent credit boom and 
bust cycle with a comprehensive and unique micro data-set that allows for a better 
identification of the fundamental determinants of credit during a boom and ensuing 
bust. 
We have used a part of the data set also in another paper. In Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydró and Saurina (2011a) we analyze the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
until 2008 using the loan applications. Our innovation in this paper is two-fold: first, 
																																																								
2	Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011) analyze household loan applications to German saving banks 
before and during the recent crisis and find that banks with exposure to US subprime assets grant less 
loan applications during the crisis. However, different to our paper, they cannot control for non-
financial-borrowers*time fixed effects, which exhaustively control for time-varying unobserved and 
observed heterogeneity in non-financial borrower fundamentals and, as we show in this paper, are 
crucial not to bias the estimates of the potency of the balance-sheet channel.	5	
	
we analyze the (non-financial borrower) firm balance-sheet channel and compare it 
to the bank balance-sheet channel, and (ii) we analyze the crisis period and compare 
it to the preceding boom years. These two innovations are crucial for testing models 
and for public policy analysis, and substantially differentiate our two papers. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the empirical 
strategy. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes by 
highlighting the relevant implications for theory and for public policy analysis. 
2.  Data and Empirical Strategy 
In this Section we first discuss the data we employ in our empirical work, second 
we present and discuss the empirical strategy highlighting the testable predictions 
emanating from theory. Finally, we provide the definition of the dependent and 
independent variables and the main econometric specification. 
A. Data 
We have access to The Credit Register of the Banco de España (CIR), which 
contains confidential information on all business loans granted by all banks 
operating in Spain (see Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) for a detailed description 
of the CIR). 
To analyze credit demand, we focus on loan applications for commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans (82 percent of total loans) by non-financial publicly-limited 
and limited-liability companies (that account for around 95 percent of all firms) to 
commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives (that account for more than 
95 percent of the entire Spanish financial system).
3  The dataset contains loan 
applications from potential borrowers to banks that they are not currently borrowing 
																																																								
3 Delgado, Salas and Saurina (2007) explain the main features of the Spanish banking system. 6	
	
from (i.e., the extensive margin of new lending). Loan applications are available 
since 2002:01. Though the applications can be made at any time, they are collated 
monthly and uniquely link borrowers with banks (Jiménez et al. (2011a) provides a 
detailed description of this dataset). 
We analyse the loan applications until 2010:06, the time of the start of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. For each loan application between 2002:02 
and 2010:06, we also observe whether the loan is accepted and granted, or not, by 
matching the loan application database with the CIR database, which contains the 
stock of all the loans granted. Therefore, if multiple banks request information on a 
particular borrower, we can infer the bank that granted the loan and the banks that 
did not. In case there is a loan application but the bank does not grant the loan, either 
the bank denied the firm credit or the firm perceived the offered conditions by the 
bank to be less attractive than those of the loan it eventually took. Hence, we can 
link loan granting for the same firm within each month to bank balance-sheet 
strength, and we can also analyse the success of a loan application depending on the 
firm balance-sheet strength. 
We therefore match the application dataset with bank and firm datasets, so that 
we have balance-sheet information for each bank that receives a loan application and 
for the firm that applies for a loan. The banks’ dataset, at a monthly frequency 
starting in 1984, is owned by the Banco de España in its role as banking supervisor. 
The firms’ dataset is available from the Spanish Mercantile Register at a yearly 
frequency, starts in 1992 and covers the large majority of firms. We can match 
427,364 loan applications to bank balance-sheet data and 198,350 loan applications 7	
	
to both bank and firm balance-sheet data, which constitute our two samples of loan 
applications that we analyze.
4 
B. Empirical Strategy 
The theory of the bank and firm balance-sheet channels that we discuss in the 
Introduction has the following testable predictions. Bank and firm variables that 
proxy for the strength of balance sheets determine loan application granting, and the 
impact is stronger in crisis than in good times. Given that the main problem in the 
literature is to identify the channels, we emphasize more the empirical strategy and 
the data that is needed to test the predictions emanating from the theoretical 
literature. 
As we have access to loan applications plus the bank and firm balance-sheet 
characteristics that determine balance-sheet strength, we are able to better 
disentangle the supply from the demand for loans. Through the loan applications, 
loan demand for each bank is in a sense given and observed, and each bank has to 
decide only on the granting of each loan knowing the firm. As far as we are aware, 
ours is the first paper that analyzes the impact of the bank versus the firm balance-
sheet channel relying on the probability loans are granted following applications 
from firms. 
To analyze the bank and firm balance-sheet channels we exploit the cross-
sectional implications of the sensitivity of credit availability in good and crisis times 
according to the strength of the balance sheets (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000) for 
																																																								
4 In case there is no balance-sheet information for a firm, there is nevertheless the firm identity, 
which is crucial to identify credit supply as we discuss below. The loan applications which are not 
matched to the firm balance-sheet data are from very small firms since CIR collects all business loans 
from all the firms in Spain, including the very small ones. 8	
	
the bank balance-sheet (or lending) channel and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1996) for the firm balance-sheet channel). 
Following the theoretical literature (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011)) we focus on bank and 
firm capital ratios.
5 Since risk also affects net worth, we also feature for banks a non-
performing (“doubtful”) loan ratio and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the bank’s 
credit portfolio by industry that proxies for bank diversification. For firms we feature 
a measure of previous bad credit history and the age of the firm. Following Kashyap 
and Stein (2000) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) we also feature the bank 
and firm liquidity ratios and size. 
We control with bank and firm fixed effects for time-invariant characteristics of 
banks and firms respectively, such as for example bank type (i.e., commercial, 
savings or cooperative) and firm legal structure, industry and location. Moreover, 
given that banks of different net worth may be approached by borrowers with 
different net worth and risk, our benchmark regressions have the largest set of 
possible controls: Firm*month fixed effects to identify the bank balance-sheet 
channel and bank*month fixed effects to identify the firm balance-sheet channel. 
Firm*month fixed effects are a complete set of monthly dummies (from 2002:02 
to 2010:06) for each firm, which therefore control exhaustively for all time-varying 
observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity. This set of effects is key to control for 
the demand side, and hence, to identify the bank balance-sheet channel. Bank*month 
fixed effects are a complete set of monthly dummies (from 2002:02 to 2010:06) for 
																																																								
5 Off-balance sheet volumes are very small in Spain. Hence, total bank assets cover most of the 
banks’ businesses. Banks did not develop conduits and/or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) 
because the prevailing accounting rules made banks consolidate these vehicles and set aside sufficient 
capital, eliminating the incentives of banks for developing such structures. 9	
	
each bank, which therefore control exhaustively for all time-varying observed and 
unobserved bank heterogeneity. Similarly this set of effects is key to control for the 
supply side, and hence, to identify the firm balance-sheet channel. 
Given that these comprehensive sets of fixed effects does not allow including 
concurrently respectively both firm or bank balance sheet variables, we also analyze 
specifications without these sets of fixed effects. In these cases, i.e., when there are 
no time fixed effects included, we control for macro factors with real GDP growth, 
the change in the interbank 3-month interest rate, and inflation (using the Consumer 
Price Index). 
C. Dependent Variable, Independent Variables and Specifications 
In this subsection we provide the definition of the main dependent variable, the 
independent variables, and the estimated specifications. 
1.  Main Dependent Variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 
Table 1 defines the dependent and independent variables employed in the first set 
of empirical specifications where we only analyze the bank balance-sheet channel, 
and Table 4 defines the second set, where we analyze both the bank and the firm 
balance-sheet channels. Tables 1 and 4 also present their descriptive statistics for the 
whole period (2002:02-2010:06), for the good times (2002:02-2007:07), and for the 
crisis times (2007:08-2010:06). 
The dependent variable we feature throughout the paper is LOAN 
APPLICATION IS GRANTED (we recurrently shorthand this as “loan granting”), 
which equals one if the loan application by firm i at time t is approved by bank b and 
the loan is granted in month t to t+3, and equals zero otherwise. The average value 10	
	
of loan granting equals 39 percent in both Tables 1 and 4 in good times and 30 
percent in crisis times.
6 
We match each loan application with its relevant bank and firm characteristics, in 
particular firm identity. The inclusion of firm (or firm-month) fixed effects in a logit 
(or probit) model naturally restricts the sample to those firms that filed at least one 
application that did result in a loan granted and one application that did not during 
the sample period (or in a month). To avoid this selection problem we employ linear 
probability models in the regressions. 
2.  Independent Variables  
As independent variables we include an array of bank and firm characteristics that 
proxy for bank and firm balance-sheet strength. The summary statistics of Table 1 
are based on the observations used in the first three Tables that include only bank 
characteristics (and possibly firm fixed effects or firm*time fixed effects). Bank 
balance-sheet data is taken at the end of the previous month t-1. 
The bank balance-sheet variables we are foremost interested in are bank size, 
capital, liquidity and risk. Bank size is the log of the total assets of the bank, BANK 
LN(TOTAL ASSETS), its average is 17.27 in good times and 17.71 in crisis times 
(31 and 49 billion Euros, respectively). The BANK CAPITAL RATIO as a measure 
of the bank’s net worth which is defined as the ratio of core capital over total assets 
of the bank (as in Bernanke and Lown (1991) for example). Core capital is defined 
as total equity plus retained earnings. As we use the book value of equity and assets 
are not risk adjusted, our measure is equivalent to a pure leverage ratio. Thus defined 
it has an average value of 5.47 percent in good times and 5.39 percent in crisis times. 
																																																								
6 As we explained above, there is no firm balance-sheet data for some loan applications but firm 
identity is always known and so is complete bank balance-sheet data. 11	
	
We also use a measure of banks’ liquidity position. The BANK LIQUIDITY 
RATIO is the ratio of liquid assets held by the bank (i.e., cash and deposits with 
central banks and other credit institutions, and public debt with a maturity up to one 
year) and the total assets of the bank. Banks on average held 17.14 percent of their 
balance-sheet in liquid assets in good times but only 12.51 percent in crisis times. 
We proxy bank risk by the doubtful loan ratio of the BANK DOUBTFUL 
LOANS RATIO which has an average value of 0.73 percent in good times and 2.71 
in crisis times, and by the BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry, which has an average 
value of 27.26 in good times and 28.58 in crisis times. 
As a bank-firm relationship variable we include LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS 
WITH THE BANK), which is the log of one plus the number of months that the 
bank had a working relationship with the firm. 
To analyze the firm balance-sheet channel we include a broad set of firm 
characteristics that proxy for the strength of firm balance sheets (see Table 4 for the 
summary statistics). Parallel to the bank variables, as firm variables we feature: 
FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS), the log of the total assets, which has a value of 7.65 in 
good times and 7.74 in crisis times (2 and 2.2 million Euros, respectively); FIRM 
CAPITAL RATIO, which is the log of the ratio of own funds over total assets of the 
firm, which has an average value of 2.57 in good times and 2.84 in crisis times; the 
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO, the current assets over total assets of the firm, which 
has an average value of 6.71 in good times and 7.09 in crisis times. 
For firm risk we use FIRM SUBPRIME, a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm had delinquent loans before the loan was requested, and equals zero otherwise. 12	
	
Its average value equals 10 percent in good times and 12 percent in crisis times; and 
FIRM LN(1+AGE), the log of one plus the age of the firm in years that has an 
average value of 1.96 in good times and 2.26 in crisis times (7 and 9 years, 
respectively).  
3.  Specifications  
The specifications we estimate are at the loan application-level and we match the 
loan application outcomes (whether the loan is granted or not) with the associated 
bank and firm balance-sheet variables. We analyze first good times (2002:02-
2007:07) and then we analyze the whole period (2002:02-2010:06) introducing a 
crisis dummy variable that takes the value of one after 2007:07 and its interactions 
with the bank and firm balance sheet variables. We provide in the next Section the 
exact empirical specification we discuss in each Table, but the most general 
empirical specification assessing the probability a loan application is granted is 
structured as follows: 
 
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDbit =  
bankbt-1 + firmit-1 + CRISISt-1 + CRISISt-1 * bankbt-1 + CRISISt-1 * firmit-1 + fixed 
effects + εbit, 
(1)
 
where  bank  and  firm are respectively the bank and the firm balance-sheet 
variables presented above, CRISIS is the crisis dummy that takes the value of one in 
the sample months after 2007:07 and equals zero otherwise, CRISIS * bank and 
CRISIS * firm are the interactions between the dummy crisis and the firm and bank 
balance-sheet variables, fixed effects are the different specifications of bank, time 13	
	
and firm fixed effects we presented above, in particular bank, time, firm, firm*time, 
and bank*time fixed effects. The theory of the bank and firm balance-sheet channels 
predict that bank and firm variables proxying for balance-sheet strength matter, and 
especially in crisis times (i.e., when CRISIS = 1).  
3.  Results 
We first analyze the bank balance-sheet channel with the sample composed by all 
loan applications (see Tables 1 to 3), and then we analyze the bank and the firm 
balance-sheet channels with the sample of loan applications matched to both bank 
and firm balance-sheet data (see Tables 4 to 6). 
A. The Bank Balance-Sheet Channel 
Table 1, as explained in the previous Section, provides in addition to the variable 
definitions also the summary statistics. Table 2 provides the results for the bank 
balance-sheet channel for the period of good times and Table 3 for the whole period. 
The specifications we estimate are as follows: 
 
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDbit = 
bankbt-1 + controlsbit + fixed effects + εbit, 
(2)
 
where bank includes BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS), BANK CAPITAL RATIO, 
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO, BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO, and BANK 
HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY; and controls include LN(1+NUMBER OF 
MONTHS WITH THE BANK), GDP GROWTH, CHANGE IN 3-MONTH 14	
	
INTEREST RATE, and INFLATION. The latter three variables drop out when we 
include time effects starting in Model 2. 
In Table 2, when we do not control for time or firm fixed effects yet, but only 
include bank fixed effects (Model 1), we find that smaller banks grant loans with a 
higher probability than larger banks. The estimated coefficient equals -3.61***.
7 
Given that we estimate linear probability models and given that the estimated 
coefficients are expressed in percent, the economic magnitude of the effect can be 
readily approximated. A decrease in bank asset size of one standard deviation (i.e., 
1.47), increases the probability a loan application is granted by 5.2 percentage points 
(= 1.45 times 3.61***). This is a sizeable effect given that the probability that a loan 
application is accepted in good times equals 39 percent, implying a semi-elasticity of 
13 percent. 
Banks with a more diverse loan portfolio also grant loans with a higher 
probability, but the economic magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller: A one 
standard deviation lower concentration results in a 1.3 percentage points increase 
(9.40 times -0.14**) in granting loans. This finding implies that in good times banks 
that are diversified across industries are more likely to grant loans. 
Finally, we find that banks are more likely to grant loans to firms with a longer 
previous relationship (but the economic relevancy is also modest) and that a one 
percentage point higher GDP growth implies a 2.9 percentage points higher 
probability of loan granting (= 1 times 2.92***). 
Model 2 adds time fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on bank size turns 
statistically insignificant. In Model 3 we add firm fixed effects and bank liquidity 
																																																								
7 As in the Tables, ***, **, and * indicates statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 15	
	
becomes marginally statistically significant. Time and firm fixed effects control 
partially for loan demand net worth and risk and, as the change of results suggest, 
they are necessary as for example banks with different size and liquidity likely have 
different type of borrowers. 
Yet to fully control for credit demand we need to control for both time-varying 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in firm balance-sheet strength (since the 
business and monetary cycle affect credit demand). We do this in Model 4 where we 
add firm*time fixed effects in addition to bank fixed effects. Now only the estimated 
coefficients on bank concentration and the bank-firm relationship variables are now 
statistically significant, but as calculated earlier in Model 1 their economic relevancy 
is rather modest. 
In sum, analyzing the effect of bank balance sheet strength on the probability a 
loan is granted following applications, the evidence suggests that the heterogeneity 
in bank balance-sheet strength (i.e., bank size, capital, liquidity, and risk) does not 
determine loan granting in good times. 
In Table 3 we use loan applications from the whole period and through 
interactions of the crisis dummy with bank balance-sheet variables aim to 
differentiate the impact of bank balance-sheet strength on lending in normal versus 
crisis times. As the crisis shock was unexpected, it is difficult to believe that banks 
already adjusted their balance sheets anticipating the crisis.
8 
The specifications we now estimate are: 
 
																																																								
8 Our results are similar if during the crisis period we use the relevant values for bank and firm 
characteristics immediately prior to 2007:08. 16	
	
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDbit =  
bankbt-1 + CRISISt-1 + CRISISt-1 * bankbt-1 + controlsbit + fixed effects + εbit, 
(3)
 
where bank and controls include the same set of variables as in (2). 
The crisis drastically decreases the probability a loan application is successful. 
Likely concurrent lower GDP growth, a higher short-term interest rate, and higher 
inflation also result in a lower probability of loan granting. 
When analyzing the “strongest” specification, our benchmark Model 4, which is 
saturated with comprehensive sets of bank and firm*time fixed effects, we find that 
bank balance-sheet variables do not matter in normal times, but do matter in crisis 
times. In particular, banks that are smaller, with lower capital ratios, or with more 
doubtful loans are less likely to grant loans in crisis times. Banks also tend to grant 
more loan applications to firms which they had lent in the past, but this effect is not 
different between crisis and good times. 
The economic relevancy of the estimated effects of the bank balance sheet 
strength is sizable. For example for a one standard deviation commensurate change 
in crisis times in bank size (decrease), capital (decrease), or doubtful loan ratio 
(increase) the probability a bank loan application is granted decreases by 1.0, 1.8 and 
2.3 percentage points, respectively (-1.46 times 0.66***; -1.84 times 0.95***; 2.27 
times -1.03**).
9 As the probability a loan application is granted in crisis times equals 
30 percent, the semi-elasticities amount to 3.3, 6 and 7 percent, respectively. 
																																																								
9 Rochet and Vives (2004) and Vives (2011b) show that low bank net worth (capital and doubtful 
ratio) negatively affect bank liquidity, especially during crisis times (leading, therefore, to a reduction 
in bank assets, in particular new credit). See also Gale and Yorulmazer (2011).	17	
	
In sum, analyzing multiple loan applications from the same borrower in the same 
month (firm*time fixed effects), and accounting for all time-invariant bank 
characteristics, banks with stronger balance-sheets grant loan applications more 
readily than banks with weaker balance-sheets in crisis times, but not in good times. 
Hence the results suggest that credit supply factors only matter in crisis times. Not 
controlling exhaustively for the firm balance-sheet channel biases the estimates of 
the potency of the bank lending channel. 
B. The Bank and Firm Balance-Sheet Channels  
Table 4, as explained in Section 2, provides the summary statistics for the loan 
applications that are also matched with firm balance sheets. Table 5 provides the 
results for the period of good times for the bank and firm balance-sheet channels and 
Table 6 for the whole period. 
The specifications we now estimate take the form: 
 
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDbit =  
bankbt-1 + firmit-1 + controlsbit + fixed effects + εbit, 
(4)
 
where bank and controls include the same set of variables as in (2) and (3), while 
firm includes: FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS), FIRM CAPITAL RATIO, FIRM 
LIQUIDITY RATIO, FIRM SUBPRIME, and FIRM LN(1+AGE). 
In Tables 5 and 6 we follow the structure of the previous Tables and 
progressively saturate the specification with comprehensive sets of fixed effects, i.e., 
we introduce comprehensive sets of bank, time, firm and/o bank*time effects. 18	
	
In Models 1 and 2, without controlling for firm fixed effects, we find similar 
results for the bank variables as in Table 2 and we also find that smaller firms, with a 
lower capital ratio or that are younger have higher probability of being successful in 
their loan application. 
In Model 3 we control for firm fixed effects (in addition to bank and time fixed 
effects that were introduced in Models 1 and 2, respectively). We now find that firms 
with a higher capital ratio and with a better credit history have higher loan granting 
probability, and we still find that smaller firms obtain higher credit granting. We also 
find similar results for bank variables as in Model 3 of Table 2. 
In Models 4 and 5 we introduce bank*time fixed effects in addition to the firm 
fixed effects to control for time-varying observed and unobserved heterogeneity in 
bank balance-sheet strength. Given the large set of fixed effects we cannot double 
cluster: Model 4 therefore provides the results with firm clustering and Model 5 with 
bank clustering. We find that in good times firms with higher capital ratio and with a 
better credit history have a higher probability their application will be resulting in a 
loan being granted. 
The estimated effects are also economically relevant. A one standard deviation 
increase in the firm capital ratio results in a 3 percentage points increase in the 
probability (1.16 times 2.56***), a semi-elasticity of 8 percent (3 divided by 39). 
Firms that are prime have a 7 percentage points higher probability of getting a loan 
upon applying than subprime firms. 
Importantly as well, as in Tables 2 and 3 for the bank channel, the results imply 
that not controlling for firm fixed effects or bank*time fixed effects biases the 
estimates of the potency of the firm balance-sheet channel, in particular the elasticity 19	
	
of firm capital and subprime without firm fixed effects, and of firm size without 
bank*time fixed effects. 
Next in Table 6 we estimate specifications of the form: 
 
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDbit =  
bankbt-1 + firmit-1 + CRISISt-1 + CRISISt-1 * bankbt-1 + CRISISt-1 * firmit-1 + 
controlsbit + fixed effects + εbit, 
(5)
 
where  bank,  firm and controls include the same set of variables as were 
introduced in (2) and (3), and (5), respectively. 
In the benchmark regressions including firm fixed effects in conjunction with 
bank*time fixed effects (columns 4 and 5), we find that firms with a lower capital 
ratio are less likely to obtain credit in general, but that the effects are stronger in 
crisis times. A one standard deviation decrease in the firm capital ratio in good times 
lowers the probability by 2 percentage points (-1.11 times 1.51***), and a similar 
decrease in the capital ratio in crisis times lowers the probability by an additional 3 
percentage points (-1.16 times 2.40***), implying a total semi-elasticity of 17 
percent (5 divided by 30).  
Younger firms are also less likely to obtain credit following an application in the 
crisis times with a similarly sized economic effect. Interestingly, subprime firms are 
penalized equally in crisis versus good times. Finally, and similarly as in Table 3 but 20	
	
differently to the firm balance-sheet channel, the bank balance-sheet strength does 
not matter in good times, but it does in crisis times (see Models 1 to 3).
10 
In sum, results suggest that heterogeneity in bank balance-sheet strength does not 
determine loan granting in good times. However, it does determine loan granting in 
the crisis. In consequence, the results suggest that credit supply factors only matter 
in crisis times. 
When analyzing firm balance-sheet strength, we instead find evidence that firm 
heterogeneity in balance-sheet strength determines loan application granting both in 
good and crisis times. Firm balance-sheet strength, nevertheless, matters more in 
crisis than in good times, with key elasticities as firm leverage to loan application 
granting more than doubling in crisis times as compared to good times. 
Finally, the results imply unequivocally that not controlling exhaustively for the 
firm balance-sheet channel biases the estimates of the potency of the bank balance-
sheet channel, and that similarly not controlling exhaustively for the bank balance-
sheet channel biases the estimates of the potency of the firm balance-sheet channel. 
4.  Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy  
The recent crisis has resulted in massive transfers from governments and central 
banks to banks, through government bail-outs, recapitalizations and liquidity 
assistance and various central bank lender-of-last-resort actions to help banks in 
repairing their capital and liquidity positions. Our evidence shows that weaknesses in 
bank balance sheets reduces the supply of bank credit in crisis times (credit crunch) 
and, therefore, our estimates lend support to theories that emphasize the role of 
																																																								
10	Notice that we do not control for firm*time fixed effects in Table 6 and that the coefficient on the 
bank doubtful loan ratio is not significant, see Table 3 Model 3 versus 4 where this coefficient was 
only statistically significant when we introduce firm*time fixed effects and the coefficient increases 
from to Model 3 to 4 by a factor of almost ten.	21	
	
banks for the business cycle and crises (see e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); Allen 
and Gale (2007); Matsuyama (2007); Shleifer and Vishny (2010b); Shleifer and 
Vishny (2010a); Adrian and Shin (2011); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011); Diamond and 
Rajan (2011), Vives (2011b)).  
Firm balance-sheet strength matters in general but effects are stronger in crisis 
times as highlighted by our estimates of the potency of the firm-balance sheet 
channel (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996); Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Lorenzoni (2008); Jeanne and Korinek (2010)). 
A crucial firm balance sheet characteristic that matters in the crisis is firm leverage, 
in particular high leverage, which lends support to the theories of firm debt overhang 
and deleveraging (see e.g. Myers (1977)). This implies that even if the government 
support to banks helps bank credit availability, firms’ balance-sheet strength and 
access to finance is also important. Therefore, our results support some of the 
policies by the Federal Reserve targeted to non-financial borrowers’ access to 
finance. 
Though our results indicate that heterogeneity in bank balance-sheet do not 
determine loan application granting in good times, it does not mean that banks are 
irrelevant for credit built-up in good times. Risk-taking incentives captured by 
changes in composition in credit supply could be more important in good times 
(Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2011b), Allen and Rogoff (2011)). Finally, 
our findings that bank strength does significantly matter in crisis times for lending 
policies supports current work by regulators to strengthen capital and liquidity levels 
at each individual bank, so that when the next crisis arrives banks are in a better 22	
	
position to cope with it and, thus, the crisis will have a attenuated impact on credit 
granting (i.e., a “softer” credit crunch) and, therefore, on the real economy.
11 
																																																								
11	Support in the literature for stronger regulatory requirements can be found in Admati, DeMarzo, 
Hellwig and Pleiderer (2010), Hellwig (2010), Repullo, Saurina and Trucharte (2010) and Hanson, 
Kashyap and Stein (2011), among others. Insurance contracts contingent on average bank capital as a 
way to insure against systemic crises are discussed in Gersbach (2011). For a discussion on 











Allen,	 F.,	 and	 D.	 Gale,	 2007,	 Understanding	Financial	Crises,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	New	York	NY.	













—,	 1989,	 "Agency	 Costs,	 Net	 Worth,	 and	 Business	 Fluctuations,"	 American	
Economic	Review	79,	14‐31.	
























Gertler,	M.,	and	S.	Gilchrist,	1994,	"Monetary	Policy,	Business	C ycles,	and 	t he	
















M o n e t a r y 	P o l i c y : 	I d e n t i f y i n g 	t h e 	B a n k 	B a l a n c e ‐ S h e e t 	C h a n n e l 	w i t h	 Loan	
Applications,"	American	Economic	Review,	Forthcoming.	
—,	2011b,	Hazardous	Times	for	Monetary	Policy:	What	Do	Twenty‐Three	Million	









Kindleberger,	 C.	 P.,	 1978,	 Manias,	 Panics,	 and	 Crashes:	 A	 History	 of	 Financial	
Crises,	Basic	Books,	New	York.	25	
	


















Resort:	 Was	 Bagehot	 Right	 After	 All?,"	 Journal	 of	 the	 European	 Economic	
Association	2,	1116‐1147.	
Schularick,	 M.,	 and	 A.	 Taylor,	 2011,	 "Credit	 Booms	 Gone	 Bust,"	 American	
Economic	Review,	Forthcoming.	
Shleifer,	 A.,	 and	 R.	 W.	 Vishny,	 2010a,	 "Asset	 Fire	 Sales	 and	 Credit	 Easing,"	
American	Economic	Review	100,	46‐50.	
—,	2010b,	"Unstable	Banking,"	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	97,	306‐318.	





Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for all loan applications
Variable Names




BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK)
CRISIS
GDP GROWTH
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE
INFLATION
Descriptive Statistics Mean St. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Whole Period (2002:02-2010:06) Number of Observations =  427,364
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 17.49 1.47 9.60 17.66 19.94
BANK CAPITAL RATIO 5.43 2.03 0.00 4.91 87.17
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 14.90 7.53 0.03 14.00 92.07
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 1.69 1.93 0 0.82 58.61
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY 27.90 8.84 13.20 25.62 100
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.38 1.11 0 0 5.67
CRISIS 0.48 0.50 0 0 1
GDP GROWTH 1.71 2.71 -4.45 3.02 4.11
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE -0.28 1.53 -4.38 0.09 1.41
INFLATION 2.68 1.56 -1.37 2.92 5.27
Good Times (2002:02-2007:07) Number of Observations =  220,275
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 17.27 1.45 9.60 17.40 19.71
BANK CAPITAL RATIO 5.47 2.20 0.00 4.91 63.10
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 17.14 8.10 0.03 15.40 92.07
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 0.73 0.66 0 0.54 28.33
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY 27.26 9.40 13.20 24.01 87.94
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.32 1.01 0 0 5.56
GDP GROWTH 3.56 0.42 2.57 3.65 4.11
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE 0.28 0.81 -1.40 0.19 1.31
INFLATION 3.11 0.62 2.13 3.15 4.19
Crisis Times (2007:08-2010:06) Number of Observations =  207,089
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 0.30 0.46 0 0 1
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 17.71 1.46 9.94 17.87 19.94
BANK CAPITAL RATIO 5.39 1.84 0.00 4.91 87.17
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 12.51 6.02 0.53 11.74 90.76
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 2.71 2.27 0 2.23 58.61
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY 28.58 8.15 13.65 26.89 100
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.44 1.21 0 0 5.67
GDP GROWTH -0.27 2.73 -4.45 -0.49 3.58
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE -0.87 1.86 -4.38 -0.50 1.41
INFLATION 2.22 2.05 -1.37 1.77 5.27
Annual change of Spanish 3-month interbank interest rates, in percent
Annual change of Spanish Consumer Price Index, in percent
A dummy variable which equals one in months after 2007:07 and equals zero
otherwise
Variable Definition
A dummy variable which equals one if the loan application by firm i at time (i.e.,
month) t is approved by bank b and the loan is granted in month t to t+3, and
equals zero otherwise
The ratio of liquid assets (cash and balance with central banks, and loans and
advances to governments and credit institutions) held by the bank over the total
assets of the bank, in percent
The log of one plus the duration of the relationship between bank and firm, in
months
The log of total assets of the bank, in thousands of Euros
The ratio of bank equity over total assets of the bank, in percent
The doubtful loan ratio of the bank, in percent
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the bank's credit portfolio by industry
Annual change of Spanish gross domestic product in real terms, in percentTable 2
The bank balance-sheet channel during good times (2002:02-2007:07) using all loan applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) -3.61 *** -1.74 -0.60 -0.27
(1.38) (1.76) (1.85) (1.74)
BANK CAPITAL RATIO -0.10 -0.06 0.07 0.30
(0.30) (0.33) (0.27) (0.27)
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 * -0.13
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08)
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO -0.22 -0.20 0.18 0.24
(0.68) (0.68) (0.61) (0.54)
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY -0.14 ** -0.13 * -0.14 ** -0.15 ***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 1.21 *** 1.22 *** 0.99 *** 1.10 ***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19)
GDP GROWTH 2.92 ***
(1.05)





Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time No Yes Yes -
Firm No No Yes -
Firm*Time No No No Yes
Number of Observations 220,275 220,275 220,275 220,275
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (S.E.) in percent clustered at the bank and firm level
from linear probability models estimated using least squares. The dependent variable is LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED.
Fixed effects are included ("Yes"), not included ("No"), or comprised by the included set of fixed effects ("-"). The set of time fixed
effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the sample period. The variable definitions and summary
statistics are in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.Table 3
The bank balance-sheet channel during good (2002:02-2007:07) and crisis times (2007:08-2010:06) using all loan applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.23 0.04 -0.11 -0.10
(2.20) (3.49) (2.85) (2.19)
BANK CAPITAL RATIO -0.30 -0.44 0.15 -0.02
(0.38) (0.41) (0.34) (0.31)
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07)
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 0.26 0.15 -0.73 *** 0.35
(0.72) (0.73) (0.22) (0.46)
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 1.22 *** 1.23 *** 0.86 *** 1.11 ***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19)
CRISIS -22.23 ***
(7.64)
CRISIS * BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 0.75 ** 0.70 ** 0.01 0.66 ***
(0.32) (0.31) (0.07) (0.24)
CRISIS * BANK CAPITAL RATIO 0.99 *** 0.95 *** 0.32 *** 0.95 ***
(0.24) (0.26) (0.10) (0.17)
CRISIS * BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
CRISIS * BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO -0.60 -0.76 -0.12 -1.03 **
(0.75) (0.78) (0.12) (0.47)
CRISIS * BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 ** -0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05)
CRISIS *  LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.14 0.13 0.07 -0.16
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.22)
GDP GROWTH 1.84 ***
(0.37)





Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time No Yes Yes -
Firm No No Yes -
Firm*Time No No No Yes
Number of Observations 427,364 427,364 427,364 427,179
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (S.E.) in percent clustered at the bank and firm level from linear
probability models estimated using least squares. The dependent variable is LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED. Fixed effects are included ("Yes"),
not included ("No"), or comprised by the included set of fixed effects ("-"). The set of time fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one)
year:month during the sample period. The variable definitions and summary statistics are in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significanta t
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.Table 4







Descriptive Statistics Mean St. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Whole Period (2002:02-2010:06) Number of Observations =  198,350
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 17.49 1.47 9.60 17.66 19.94
BANK CAPITAL RATIO 5.43 2.03 0.00 4.91 87.17
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 14.90 7.53 0.03 14.00 92.07
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 1.69 1.93 0 0.82 58.61
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY 27.90 8.84 13.20 25.62 100
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.38 1.11 0 0 5.67
FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 7.70 1.68 1.45 7.65 15.82
FIRM CAPITAL RATIO 2.70 1.11 -5.12 2.88 4.61
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO 6.90 11.01 0 2.81 100
FIRM SUBPRIME 0.09 0.29 0 0 1
FIRM LN(1+AGE) 2.11 0.91 0 2.20 4.92
CRISIS 0.48 0.50 0 0 1
GDP GROWTH 1.71 2.71 -4.45 3.02 4.11
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE -0.28 1.53 -4.38 0.09 1.41
INFLATION 2.68 1.56 -1.37 2.92 5.27
Good Times (2002:02-2007:07) Number of Observations =  100,110
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 17.26 1.42 9.60 17.39 19.71
BANK CAPITAL RATIO 5.44 2.28 0.00 4.90 63.10
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 17.68 8.30 0.03 15.82 92.07
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 0.72 0.64 0 0.54 28.33
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY 26.92 9.34 13.74 23.43 87.94
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.46 1.19 0 0 5.56
FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 7.65 1.72 1.48 7.59 15.06
FIRM CAPITAL RATIO 2.57 1.16 -5.12 2.75 4.61
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO 6.71 11.09 0 2.62 100
FIRM SUBPRIME 0.10 0.31 0 0 1
FIRM LN(1+AGE) 1.96 0.92 0 2.08 4.82
GDP GROWTH 3.54 0.43 2.57 3.64 4.11
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE 0.24 0.82 -1.40 0.11 1.31
INFLATION 3.12 0.62 2.13 3.15 4.19
Crisis Times (2007:08-2010:06) Number of Observations =  98,240
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 0.30 0.46 0 0 1
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 17.68 1.42 10.31 17.84 19.94
BANK CAPITAL RATIO 5.33 1.81 0.00 4.85 62.44
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 12.54 6.09 0.53 11.74 87.64
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 2.80 2.27 0 2.41 21.93
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY 28.55 8.26 13.65 27.00 100
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 0.63 1.42 0 0 5.67
FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 7.74 1.63 1.45 7.70 15.82
FIRM CAPITAL RATIO 2.84 1.04 -4.26 3.01 4.60
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO 7.09 10.92 0 3.02 100
FIRM SUBPRIME 0.12 0.33 0 0 1
FIRM LN(1+AGE) 2.26 0.88 0 2.40 4.92
GDP GROWTH -0.42 2.70 -4.45 -0.86 3.58
CHANGE IN 3-MONTH INTEREST RATE -0.95 1.85 -4.38 -0.60 1.41
INFLATION 2.14 2.05 -1.37 1.77 5.27
Variable Definition
The log of one plus the duration of the age of the firm, in years
The log of total assets of the firm, in thousands of Euros
The log ratio of firm own funds over total assets of the firm
The ratio of current assets over the total assets of the firm, in percent
A dummy variable which equals one if the firm was delinquent on a loan before
and equals zero otherwiseTable 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) -4.45 *** -2.12 -1.31
(1.60) (2.19) (2.58)
BANK CAPITAL RATIO -0.21 -0.24 -0.20
(0.27) (0.28) (0.35)
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO -0.09 -0.14 -0.18 *
(0.14) (0.14) (0.10)
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 0.13 0.32 0.82
(0.81) (0.85) (0.85)
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY -0.07 -0.07 -0.10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 1.93 *** 1.95 *** 0.80 *** 0.78 *** 0.78 ***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20)
FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS) -1.32 *** -1.33 *** -1.68 * -1.69 -1.69
(0.31) (0.31) (0.95) (1.14) (1.09)
FIRM CAPITAL RATIO -0.96 *** -0.94 *** 2.65 *** 2.56 *** 2.56 ***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.62) (0.87) (0.71)
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
FIRM SUBPRIME -0.47 -0.41 -7.28 * -6.93 * -6.93 *
(0.59) (0.59) (3.75) (4.01) (4.08)
FIRM LN(1+AGE) -1.10 *** -1.09 *** -3.67 * -2.64 -2.64
(0.35) (0.36) (2.22) (3.02) (2.44)
GDP GROWTH 3.46 **
(1.35)





Bank Yes Yes Yes - -
Time No Yes Yes - -
Firm No No Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Time No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 100,110 100,110 100,110 100,110 100,110
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (S.E.) in percent clustered at the bank and firm level in models 1-3, at
the firm level in model 4, and at the bank level in model 5 from linear probability models estimated using least squares. The dependent variable is
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED. Fixed effects are included ("Yes"), not included ("No"), or comprised by the included set of fixed effects ("-
"). The set of time fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the sample period. The variable definitions and summary
statistics are in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
The bank and firm balance-sheet channels during good times (2002:02-2007:07) using the loan applications that are also matched with firm balance 
sheet dataTable 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) -0.10 0.02 -0.26
(2.15) (3.58) (3.02)
BANK CAPITAL RATIO -0.42 -0.55 -0.52
(0.42) (0.42) (0.40)
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO -0.05 -0.06 -0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08)
BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO 0.33 0.42 0.38
(0.69) (0.70) (0.62)
BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY -0.05 -0.08 -0.03
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) 1.92 *** 1.94 *** 0.84 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 ***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS) -1.35 *** -1.35 *** -2.65 *** -2.79 *** -2.79 ***
(0.31) (0.31) (0.67) (0.86) (0.70)
FIRM CAPITAL RATIO -0.98 *** -0.95 *** 1.47 *** 1.51 ** 1.51 ***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.51) (0.66) (0.50)
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
FIRM SUBPRIME -0.45 -0.38 -4.88 ** -4.56 ** -4.56 **
(0.58) (0.58) (1.95) (2.27) (2.05)
FIRM LN(1+AGE) -1.05 *** -1.04 *** -0.94 0.23 0.23
(0.36) (0.36) (1.81) (2.26) (1.82)
CRISIS -37.01 ***
(8.81)
CRISIS * BANK LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 1.15 *** 1.10 *** 1.13 ***
(0.38) (0.38) (0.34)
CRISIS * BANK CAPITAL RATIO 1.21 *** 1.20 *** 1.14 ***
(0.29) (0.31) (0.23)
CRISIS * BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO 0.17 0.15 0.17 *
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09)
CRISIS * BANK DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO -0.72 -0.94 -0.91
(0.70) (0.73) (0.61)
CRISIS * BANK HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 *
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
CRISIS *  LN(1+NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BANK) -0.19 -0.21 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13
(0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25)
CRISIS * FIRM LN(TOTAL ASSETS) -0.11 -0.11 -0.50 -0.38 -0.38
(0.32) (0.32) (0.41) (0.41) (0.45)
CRISIS * FIRM CAPITAL RATIO 0.97 *** 0.95 *** 2.60 *** 2.40 *** 2.40 ***
(0.33) (0.32) (0.49) (0.60) (0.49)
CRISIS * FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIO 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
CRISIS * FIRM SUBPRIME -0.49 -0.65 0.23 0.08 0.08
(0.68) (0.68) (1.32) (1.62) (1.42)
CRISIS * FIRM LN(1+AGE) 2.20 *** 2.21 *** 1.69 ** 1.86 ** 1.86 **
(0.37) (0.37) (0.71) (0.85) (0.79)
GDP GROWTH 1.74 ***
(0.48)





Bank Yes Yes Yes - -
Time No Yes Yes - -
Firm No No Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Time No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 198,350 198,350 198,350 198,350 198,350
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (S.E.) in percent clustered at the bank and firm level in models 1-3, at the firm level in
model 4, and at the bank level in model 5 from linear probability models estimated using least squares. The dependent variable is LOAN APPLICATION IS
GRANTED. Fixed effects are included ("Yes"), not included ("No"), or comprised by the included set of fixed effects ("-"). The set of time fixed effects includes a
fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the sample period. The variable definitions and summary statistics are in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates
statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
The bank and firm balance-sheet channels during good (2002:02-2007:07) and crisis times (2007:08-2010:06) using the loan applications that are also matched with
firm balance sheet data